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The Phenomenal Concept Strategy

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A powerful reply to a range of familiar anti-physicalist arguments has recently been developed. According to this reply, our possession of phenomenal concepts can explain the facts that the anti-physicalist claims can only be explained by a non-reductive account of phenomenal consciousness. Chalmers (2006) argues that the phenomenal concept strategy is doomed to fail. This article presents the phenomenal concept strategy, Chalmers' argument against it, and a defence of the strategy against his
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Dept. of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA, Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 2007-01-01

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