Representation and a Science of Consciousness
Author: Bailey, Andrew1
Source: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 14, Numbers 1-2, 2007 , pp. 62-76(15)
Publisher: Imprint Academic
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Abstract:
The first part of this paper defends a 'two-factor' approach to mental representation by moving through various choice-points that map out the main peaks in the landscape of philosophical debate about representation. The choice-points considered are: (1) whether representations are conceptual or non-conceptual; (2) given that mental representation is conceptual, whether conscious perceptual representations are analog or digital; (3) given that the content of a representation is the concept it expresses, whether that content is individuated extensionally or intensionally; (4) whether intensional contents are individuated by external or internal conditions; and (5) given that conceptual content is determined externally, whether the possession conditions for concepts are external or internal. The final part of the paper examines the relationship between representation and consciousness, arguing that any account of mental representation, though necessary for a complete account of consciousness, cannot be sufficient for it.Document Type: Research article
Affiliations: 1: Representation and a Science of Consciousness Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1, Canada., Email: abailey@uoguelph.ca
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