Skip to main content

Evolution and Epiphenomenalism

Buy Article:

$27.68 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

This paper addresses the question whether evolutionary principles are compatible with epiphenomenalism, and argues for an affirmative answer. A general summary of epiphenomenalism is provided, along with certain specifications relevant to the issues of this paper. The central argument against compatibility is stated and rebutted. A specially powerful version of the argument, due to William James (1890), is stated. The apparent power of this argument is explained as resulting from a problem about our understanding of pleasure and an equivocation on 'explanation'. Finally, an argument by Plantinga (2004), which applies to beliefs rather than phenomenal qualities, is stated and rebutted.

Keywords: Alvin Plantinga; William James; phenomenal qualities; pleasure; semantic epiphenomenalism

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011, USA., Email: wsrob@iastate.edu

Publication date: January 1, 2007

imp/jcs/2007/00000014/00000011/art00002
dcterms_title,dcterms_description,pub_keyword
6
5
20
40
5

Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
ingentaconnect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more