In Defence of Qualia-epiphenomenalism

Author: Gadenne, Volker

Source: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 13, Numbers 1-2, 2006 , pp. 101-114(14)

Publisher: Imprint Academic

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Abstract:

Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism.

Document Type: Research article

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