Quantum Leaps in Philosophy of Mind: A Critique of Stapp's Theory
The quantum mechanical theory of consciousness and freewill offered by Stapp (1993; 1995; 2000; 2004) is exposed and clarified. Decoherence-based arguments against this view are undermined in an effort to draw attention to the real problems it faces: Stapp's separate accounts of consciousness and freewill are incompatible, the interpretations of QM they are tied to are questionable, the Zeno effect could not enable freewill as he suggests because weakness of will would then be ubiquitous, and the holism of measurement in QM is not a good explanation of the unity of consciousness for essentially the same reason that local interactions may seem incapable of accounting for it.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: 2004-01-01