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Between phenomenology and neuroscience Prague, Czech Republic, 7-10 July, 2003

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It would seem reasonable to expect any comprehensive account of consciousness to accommodate two of its most fundamental attributes: that we have a self- centred sense of experience and that this sense is somehow linked to the condition of our physiology. Yet those conversant with post-Cartesian philosophy will know that time and again significant doubts have been raised about any apparently obvious link between mind and body. So of all the questions implicated in the scientific study of consciousness perhaps the most pressing is to what extent, if at all, does our mental life correlate with biochemical activity at the neuronal level? Until this is resolved we will be unable to reconcile the data gathered from phenomenological analysis of introspective experience with that derived from neuroscientific analysis of brain behaviour. The infamous gap will persist.

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: School of Art, Media and Design, University of Wales College Newport, Caerleon Campus, Newport NP18 3YH, UK., Email:

Publication date: January 1, 2003


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