Relative Phenomenalism Toward a More Plausible Theory of Mind

Author: Barkin E.1

Source: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 10, Number 8, 2003 , pp. 3-13(11)

Publisher: Imprint Academic

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Abstract:

Most philosophers believe that qualitative states must be explained in terms of physical states of the brain in order to resolve the mind/ body problem. But the severe difficulties involved in deriving the mental from the physical or, even more bizarrely, eliminating the mental altogether, have caused some to seriously investigate Russell's longstanding ideas about the intrinsic nature of physical entities. The resulting microphenomenal approaches, however, are of necessity extremely vague and complicated. Consequently, a macrophenomenal theory of mind may well be a more plausible alternative than microphenomenal ones -- especially if it takes into account the relative aspect of experience and thereby avoids reifying qualia.

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: 8 East 83rd Street #7G, New York, NY 10028, U.S.A., Email: EdBarkin@aol.com

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