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Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution

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Abstract:

Skyrms has pointed out differences between the results of rational choice theory and evolutionary game theory. This commentary argues that there is a great deal of agreement on the Nash Bargaining Solution, which maximizes the product of player payoffs, in both rational-choice-based and evolution-based theories of equilibrium selection. While evolutionary game theory has the potential to explain how we arrive at the behavioural rules that govern what we do, realistic models will require calibration through laboratory experiments. Indeed, experimental evidence strongly supports the Nash Bargaining Solution.

Document Type: Review Article

Affiliations: Dept. of Economics, North hall, University of California, Santa Barvara, CA 93106-9210, USA.

Publication date: 2000-01-01

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