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Game theory, rationality and evolution of the social contract

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Game theory based on rational choice is compared with game theory based on evolutionary, or other adaptive, dynamics. The Nash equilibrium concept has a central role to play in both theories, even though one makes extremely strong assumptions about cognitive capacities and common knowledge of the players, and the other does not. Nevertheless, there are also important differences between the two theories. These differences are illustrated in a number of games that model types of interaction that are key ingredients for any theory of the social contract.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697- 5100, USA.

Publication date: 2000-01-01

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