The inner sense of action. Agency and motor representations
Abstract:We live in a meaningful world. Our capacity to deal with the ‘external world’ is constituted by the possibility of modifying the world by means of our actions; by the possibility of representing the world as an objective reality; and by the possibility of experiencing phenomenally this same objective reality, from a situated, self-conscious perspective. It is tempting to address these different articulations of the sense of ‘being related to the world', of our intentional relation to the world, by using different languages, different methods of investigations, perhaps even different ontologies. In the present paper I will start to explore the possibility of reconciling some of these different articulations of intentionality from a neurobiological perspective
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Istituto di Fisiologia Umana, Universita di Parma, Via Volturno 39, I-43100 Parma, Italy.
Publication date: January 1, 2000