@article {Andrews:2000:1355-8250:12,
	author = "Andrews K.",
	title = "Our understanding of other minds: theory of mind and the intentional stance",
	journal = "Journal of Consciousness Studies",
	volume = "7",
	year = "2000",
	abstract = "<P>Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a &#145;theory of mind&#039;, and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett&#039;s theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all but meaningless. This entailment should not be accepted; instead, Dennett&#039;s position that intentional behaviour is best predictable via the intentional stance should be rejected in favour of a pluralistic view of behaviour prediction. I introduce an additional method which humans often use to predict intentional and non-intentional behaviour, which could be called the inductive stance.</P>",
	pages = "12-24(13)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2000/00000007/00000007/1030"
}