Our understanding of other minds: theory of mind and the intentional stance
Author: Andrews, K.
Source: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 7, Number 7, 2000 , pp. 12-24(13)
Publisher: Imprint Academic
Abstract:Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a ‘theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all but meaningless. This entailment should not be accepted; instead, Dennett's position that intentional behaviour is best predictable via the intentional stance should be rejected in favour of a pluralistic view of behaviour prediction. I introduce an additional method which humans often use to predict intentional and non-intentional behaviour, which could be called the inductive stance.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Dept. of Philosophy and Religion, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608, USA.
Publication date: 2000