The dialogue of the soul with itself
What is the cognitive significance of talking to ourselves? I criticize two interpretations of this function (the reflection model and the social model), and offer a third: I argue that inner speech is a genuine dialogue, not a monologue; that the partners in this dialogue represent the independent interests of experienced meaning and logical articulation; that the former is either silent or capable only of abbreviated speech; that articulation is a logical, not a social demand; and that neither partner is a full-time subordinate of the other. I examine the views of Plato, Arendt, Gadamer, Ryle, Piaget and Vygotsky on the nature of inner speech, and the views of Gazzaniga and Dennett on the role of inner speech in the constitution of human consciousness
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Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Dept. of Philosophy, Loyola University of Chicago 6525 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois 60626, USA.
Publication date: 01 May 1997