Physics, machines, and the hard problem

Author: Bilodeau D.J.

Source: Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 3, Numbers 5-6, 1996 , pp. 386-401(16)

Publisher: Imprint Academic

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Abstract:

The ‘hard problem’ of the origin of phenomenal consciousness in a physical universe is aggravated by a simplistic and uncritical concept of the physical realm which still predominates in much discussion of the subject. David Chalmers is correct in claiming that phenomenal experience is logically independent of a physical description of the world, but his proposal for a ‘natural supervenience’ of experience on a physical substrate is misguided. His statements about machine consciousness and the role of information are especially compromised. A careful analysis of physical concepts indicates that the hard problem as originally proposed is insoluble but also fortunately based on misconceptions. Modern physics suggests a more sophisticated and richer ontology which will be essential for a deeper understanding of our rapidly growing knowledge of psychology and neuroscience.

Keywords: Quantum mechanics; physicalism; mechanism; dynamics; consciousness

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: Indiana University Cyclotron Facility, 2401 Milo B. Sampson Lane, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA. Email: bilodeau@iucf.indiana.edu:

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