Varieties of zombiehood

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On the basis of distinguishing three different kinds of zombies (behavioural, func- tional, physiological), I argue that Moody's argument (1994) against the conscious inessentialism thesis and physicalism is invalid, and comparatively analyse similarities as well as differences between two responses to Moody: Flanagan & Polger (1995) and Dennett (1995).

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy and Center for the Study of Language & Information, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-4115, USA.

Publication date: April 1, 1995

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