This article has two aims. First, it seeks to demonstrate that the democratic credentials of statutory rights instruments are stronger than bills of rights sceptics such as Professors James Allan and Jeremy Waldron realise. It does so by examining the process by which statutory bills of rights are enacted and then provides an account as to why they are adopted that differs from the one offered by Allan and Waldron. This is done to suggest that the reason why a statutory rights instrument is adopted and the process itself has considerable democratic significance. And second, it seeks to assess the democratic credentials of Professor Allan's own critique of statutory bills of rights. The analysis undertaken in this regard reveals that in important respects Allan is anything but the majoritarian democrat that he routinely claims to be.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: January 1, 2008
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Until 2007 the King's Law Journal was known as the King's College Law Journal. It was established in 1990 as a legal periodical publishing scholarly and authoritative Articles, Notes and Reports on legal issues of current importance to both academic research and legal practice. It has a national and international readership, and publishes refereed contributions from authors across the United Kingdom, from continental Europe and further afield (particularly Commonwealth countries and USA). The journal includes a Reviews section containing critical notices of recently published books.