The issue of which standards of human rights that should be required in transitional processes has repeatedly emerged before the European Court of Human Rights in the last decade. The case of Jahn v Germany concerned property-rights, and the EctHR seems to have continued the path it took early on with regard to transitions, namely to give very broad discretion to national governments. The main problem of the line of case law adopted seems to be that it creates a an order where the underlying, but implicit assumption is that large scale transitions implies that requirements of human rights are relaxed, but that the EctHR does never spell out the requirements for such systemic transitions to be said to exist. I try to argue that although if transitional justice should not be regarded as ordinary justice, there is a strong case for spelling out the differences, and to do so on a more general basis.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: January 1, 2006
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Until 2007 the King's Law Journal was known as the King's College Law Journal. It was established in 1990 as a legal periodical publishing scholarly and authoritative Articles, Notes and Reports on legal issues of current importance to both academic research and legal practice. It has a national and international readership, and publishes refereed contributions from authors across the United Kingdom, from continental Europe and further afield (particularly Commonwealth countries and USA). The journal includes a Reviews section containing critical notices of recently published books.