Three Conceptions of Practical Authority
Authors: Star, Daniel; Delmas, Candice
Source: Jurisprudence, Volume 2, Number 1, June 2011 , pp. 143-160(18)
Publisher: Hart Publishing
Abstract:This paper compares three conceptions of practical authority: Stephen Darwall's second-personal conception, Joseph Raz's service conception, and Star and Delmas's own minimalist conception. Raz is defended against recent criticisms levelled at his conception of practical authority by Darwall, and the minimalist conception is defended as an improvement on Raz's conception. According to the minimalist conception, practical authority is simply normative authority as we encounter it in the practical sphere (just as epistemic authority is simply normative authority encountered in the epistemic sphere), and normative authority consists in the authority of normative reasons and oughts.
Document Type: Short Communication
Publication date: June 1, 2011
Jurisprudence provides a forum for scholarly writing on the philosophy of law. While demanding the utmost intellectual honesty, clarity and scholarly rigour, its editorial policy is distinctively open-minded in relation to philosophical approach. A main purpose of the journal is to encourage scholarship which explores and transcends the categories and assumptions on which contemporary jurisprudential debates are conducted, and to stimulate reflection upon traditional questions concerning the nature of law, politics and society. The journal's unique reviews section will provide in-depth discussion and analysis of major developments in the field. Jurisprudence aims: " to encourage research exploring the relation between questions in the philosophy of law and debates in related branches of philosophy, including but not limited to political philosophy, moral philosophy, the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of mind; " to support study of the intellectual history of the philosophy of law, both for its own sake and in order to shed light on contemporary jurisprudential questions; " to encourage careful research illuminating relations between jurisprudential questions and theoretical debates in anthropology, sociology, cultural and literary studies. Replies and correspondence pieces will be generally discouraged, although may be acceptable if the intention is to deepen and extend an original line of thought, and not merely to reiterate or amplify an earlier argument.
- Editorial Board
- Information for Authors
- Subscribe to this Title
- Information for Advertisers
- Email alerts (Hart books and journals)
- Sample Paper
- Publisher's Website
- ingentaconnect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites