Intermediary Independence: Auditors, Financial Analysts and Rating Agencies

$43.65 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Buy Article:


Auditors, financial analysts and rating agencies are the most important specialized information intermediaries in capital markets. Information intermediation serves to increase the credibility of issuer disclosure and overcome investor uncertainty. A certain minimum level of independence is the basic prerequisite for information intermediation to be operative. All intermediaries face similar problems in regard to impairments of their independence. Legal standards on independence should be based on a consistent theory. Common principles carved out under contract law serve as an inventory for developing a market-based model of independence. This paper argues that independence should be understood as a correlative to market access. Independence as a correlative to market access should guide the assessment of convergence and remaining divergence in the independence standards applicable to auditors, financial analysts and rating agencies.

Document Type: Research Article


Publication date: April 1, 2011

More about this publication?
  • The Journal of Corporate Law Studies provides a forum for scholarship on corporate, securities and financial law broadly construed. Thus the Journal publishes articles on subjects as diverse as insolvency and the commercial conflict of laws, in addition to mainstream topics such as directors' duties and financial regulation. The Journal also embraces interdisciplinary work and work in cognate fields.Articles published in the Journal are subject to rigorous peer review. Shorter articles and notes are refereed where appropriate.
    The Journal is published twice a year in June and October.
    The journal will be of interest to academics and practitioners specialising in any of the subjects covered, and also to those with an interest in the strategic direction of the law and the influences which affect it - thus regulators, law and policy-makers, and the judiciary.
  • Editorial Board
  • Information for Authors
  • Subscribe to this Title
  • Information for Advertisers
  • Contents
  • Sample Paper
  • Email alerts (Hart books and journals)
  • ingentaconnect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites
Related content



Share Content

Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
Cookie Policy
ingentaconnect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more