The UK has enacted a new dedicated civil liability regime in respect of issuer disclosures. This article considers how this regime in UK securities law shapes up when compared to equivalent remedies in Canadian and Australian securities laws and when set against the backdrop of current US debate on reforming investor actions. The article demonstrates that a number of investor-unfriendly features have been included in the new UK civil liability regime. When these features are considered alongside an established civil procedure system that provides only limited scope for collective redress, a clear prediction emerges: the UK is unlikely to see a surge of investor claims alleging issuer disclosure failures. The new regime reflects a policy preference for public over private enforcement. One consequence of the approach that has been adopted is that the new regime is not well designed to fill the gap should public enforcement efforts under-deter.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: October 1, 2009
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The Journal of Corporate Law Studies provides a forum for scholarship on corporate, securities and financial law broadly construed. Thus the Journal publishes articles on subjects as diverse as insolvency and the commercial conflict of laws, in addition to mainstream topics such as directors' duties and financial regulation. The Journal also embraces interdisciplinary work and work in cognate fields.Articles published in the Journal are subject to rigorous peer review. Shorter articles and notes are refereed where appropriate. The Journal is published twice a year in June and October. The journal will be of interest to academics and practitioners specialising in any of the subjects covered, and also to those with an interest in the strategic direction of the law and the influences which affect it - thus regulators, law and policy-makers, and the judiciary.