This paper discusses the multi-jurisdictional enforcement of competition law analyzing one particular dimension: the interaction between European competition law and the competition laws of the new Member States. The paper examines the transfer and implementation of the competition acquis into these countries and the leverage of the EU in the way competition laws developed in the new Member States as well as the impact of enlargement on European competition law. The paper examines whether this extraordinary way of lawmaking could efficiently deal with specific market failures and with the need to develop effective enforcement and institutional structure in transition economies. The analysis reveals relevant institutional deficits in the EU and what its cost-benefit and policy implications are for the interaction between the two jurisdictional levels (EC-CEECs). The im(com)plications of introducing private enforcement of competition law will serve as example. The central query is whether the same rules applied in a multiple variety of institutions can result in uniform and consistent law application as well as in equal gains and losses for the jurisdictions.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: December 1, 2007
More about this publication?
This scholarly, peer-reviewed publication of original articles and analysis of current developments in competition law is designed to complement and augment the existing literature with a special focus on European developments. Topics include:
Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers
Enlargement of the Union - the ramifications for Competition Policy
Unilateral and Coordinated Effects in Merger Control