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Zur Reichweite des moralischen Kontraktualismus

Überlegungen am Beispiel von David Gauthier und Peter Stemmer

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Abstract:

Contractualism, the view that morality is to be grounded on an hypothetical agreement among rational agents, is a very plausible conception for the justification of morality under modern circumstances. No metaphysical assumptions are made, morality is supposed to be erected on undisputed, minimal foundations. However, contractualists generally underestimate or downplay the degree to which their idea allows to convert might into right. This is shown exemplarily by an examination of the conceptions of David Gauthier and Peter Stemmer. A more realistic variety of contractualism would admit that, depending on contingent circumstances, idiosyncratic or massively discriminating moral principles can easily be part of the hypothetical agreements.

Language: ger

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: October 1, 2010

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  • Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, edited by authorisation of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), is an international, peer-reviewed journal, first published in 1907. It features original articles on philosophical research on legal and social questions, covering all aspects of social and legal life.
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