Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?

Author: Yermack D.1

Source: Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 39, Number 2, October 1995 , pp. 237-269(33)

Publisher: Elsevier

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Keywords: Executive compensation; Stock options; Agency; Incentives; [JEL classification codes] J33; [JEL classification codes] G32

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1016/0304-405X(95)00829-4

Affiliations: 1: Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY 10012, USA

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