Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games

Authors: Sertel M.R.; Sanver M.R.

Source: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 15, Number 2, June 1999 , pp. 149-162(14)

Publisher: Elsevier

Keywords: Lindahl solution; Games of pretension; Undominated Nash equilibrium; Manipulation via hiding of endowments; Voluntary contributions equilibrium; [JEL classification codes] H41

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00040-8

Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, Istanbul Bilgi University, 80310, Kustepe, Istanbul, Turkey

Publication date: 1999-06-01

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• In this Subject: Economics ,  Political Science
• By this author: Sertel M.R. ;  Sanver M.R.

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