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Publisher: Elsevier

Volume 14, Number 4, November 1998
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Optimal contest design: volume and timing of rent seeking in contests
pp. 575-585(11)
Author: Gradstein M.

Designing an optimal contest
pp. 587-603(17)
Authors: Dasgupta A.; Nti K.O.

Influence and the discretionary allocation of several prizes
pp. 605-625(21)
Authors: Clark D.J.; Riis C.

The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information
pp. 627-644(18)
Authors: Barut Y.; Kovenock D.

Asymmetric information contests
pp. 645-665(21)
Authors: Hurley T.M.; Shogren J.F.

Complementarity in contests
pp. 667-684(18)
Authors: Skaperdas S.; Syropoulos C.

Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests
pp. 685-701(17)
Author: Baik K.H.

Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good
pp. 703-725(23)
Author: Dijkstra B.R.

Collective contests with externalities
pp. 727-738(12)
Authors: Lee S.; Hyeong Kang J.

Collective rent seeking and division of labor
pp. 739-768(30)
Author: Hausken K.

Effort and performance in group contests
pp. 769-781(13)
Author: Nti K.O.

An experimental examination of rational rent-seeking
pp. 783-800(18)
Authors: Potters J.; de Vries C.G.; van Winden F.

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