Moral Hazard, Monitoring Costs, and Optimal Government Intervention.

Authors: Bruce N.; Wong K.Y.

Source: Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Volume 18, Number 2, July 1996 , pp. 147-148(2)

Publisher: Elsevier

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Keywords: moral hazard; monitor costs; insurance; government regulation; government intervention; risk-influencing goods

Language: English

Document Type: Abstract

DOI: 10.1016/0167-6687(96)81436-3

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