Ambiguity Aversion in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions.

Authors: Salo A.A.; Weber M.

Source: Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Volume 18, Number 2, July 1996 , pp. 147-147(1)

Publisher: Elsevier

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Keywords: auctions; bidding theory

Language: English

Document Type: Abstract

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-6687(96)81434-X

Publication date: 1996-07-01

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