The size and scope of government: - Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics

Authors: Persson T.; Tabellini G.

Source: European Economic Review, Volume 43, Number 4, April 1999 , pp. 699-735(37)

Publisher: Elsevier

Keywords: [JEL classification codes] D7; [JEL classification codes] E6; [JEL classification codes] H1; [JEL classification codes] H4; Political economics; Electoral rules; Political regimes; Public finance; Rents; Redistribution

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00131-7

Affiliations: 1: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, S-10691 Stockholm, Sweden

Publication date: 1999-04-01

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