The Efficiency of Institutions: Political Determinants of Oil Consumption in Democracies
Oil consumption has varied significantly among democracies, but scholars have not systematically studied the political determinants of this variation. What effects do political institutions have on a democratic country's propensity to consume oil? Other things being equal, more centralized national political institutions facilitate the adoption of policies that lower oil intensity. A time-series, cross-sectional analysis of all democracies since the first oil shock in 1973, using an error correction model to separate short- and long-term effects and to correct for the nonstationarity of the dependent variable, provides strong support for a link between numerous veto players and slower reductions in oil intensity along with weaker support for the influence of party decentralization.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: 2011-01-01
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- Comparative Politics is an international journal that publishes scholarly articles devoted to the comparative analysis of political institutions and behavior. It was founded in 1968 to further the development of comparative political theory and the application of comparative theoretical analysis to the empirical investigation of political issues. Comparative Politics communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, and students, and is valued by experts in research organizations, foundations, and consulates throughout the world.
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