@article {McLauchlin:2010:0010-4159:333,
title = "Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion",
journal = "Comparative Politics",
parent_itemid = "infobike://cuny/cp",
publishercode ="cuny",
year = "2010",
volume = "42",
number = "3",
publication date ="2010-03-31T00:00:00",
pages = "333-350",
itemtype = "ARTICLE",
issn = "0010-4159",
eissn = "2151-6227",
url = "https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2010/00000042/00000003/art00005",
doi = "doi:10.5129/001041510X12911363509792",
author = "McLauchlin, Theodore",
abstract = "Two common strategies for maintaining military loyaltyindividual incentives and ethnic preferenceproduce very different outcomes for defection of government troops when a rebellion arises outside the military. Since a strategy of individual incentives rests on a continuous judgment of regime strength, a rebellion can provoke a self-fulfilling prophecy that the regime will collapse. An ethnic preference policy identifies soldiers as loyal or disloyal based on group identity and gives those soldiers strong incentives to act accordingly. A rebellion by the out-group might generate out-group defection, but not in-group defection. Focusing on information about preferences, these outcomes are illustrated through a comparison of rebellions in Syria, Jordan, and Iran.",
}