Experimental Game Theory and Behavior Genetics

Authors: Cesarini, David¹; Dawes, Christopher T.²; Johannesson, Magnus³; Lichtenstein, Paul⁴; Wallace, Björn³

Source: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Volume 1167, Number 1, June 2009 , pp. 66-75(10)

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Abstract:

We summarize the findings from a research program studying the heritability of behavior in a number of widely used economic games, including trust, dictator, and ultimatum games. Results from the standard behavior genetic variance decomposition suggest that strategies and fundamental economic preference parameters are moderately heritable, with estimates ranging from 18 to 42%. In addition, we also report new evidence on so-called “hyperfair” preferences in the ultimatum game. We discuss the implications of our findings with special reference to current efforts that seek to understand the molecular genetic architecture of complex social behaviors.

Keywords: behavior genetics; experimental economics; biomarkers

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04505.x

Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142, USA 2: Political Science Department, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093, USA 3: Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden 4: Department of Medical Epidemiology and Biostatistics, Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm, Sweden

Publication date: 2009-06-01