Signification, Essence, and Meno's Paradox: A Reply to David Charles's `Types of Definition in the Meno'

Author: Fine, Gail

Source: Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, Volume 55, Number 2, 2010 , pp. 125-152(28)

Publisher: BRILL

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Abstract:

According to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno's paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn't conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno's paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows.

Keywords: signification; essence; definition; knowledge; true belief; Meno's paradox

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852810791129195

Affiliations: 1: Cornell University/Merton College Oxford, Email: gjf1@cornell.edu

Publication date: 2010-03-01