@article {Lewis:January 2009:0031-8868:1,
	author = "Lewis, Frank A.",
	title = "Parmenides' Modal Fallacy",
	journal = "Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy",
	volume = "54",
	year = "January 2009",
	abstract = "In his great poem, Parmenides uses an argument by elimination to select the correct "way of inquiry" from a pool of two, the ways of <I>is</I> and of <I>is not</I>, joined later by a third, "mixed" way of <I>is</I> and <I>is not</I>. Parmenides' first two ways are soon given modal upgrades - <I>is</I> becomes <I>cannot not be</I>, and <I>is not</I> becomes <I>necessarily is not</I> (B2, 3-6) - and these are no longer contradictories of one another. And is the common view right, that Parmenides rejects the "mixed" way because it is a contradiction? I argue that the modal upgrades are the product of an illicit modal shift. This same shift, built into two Exclusion Arguments, gives Parmenides a novel argument to show that the "mixed" way fails. Given the independent failure of the way of <I>is not</I>, Parmenides' argument by elimination is complete.",
	pages = "1-8(8)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/brill/phr/2009/00000054/00000001/art00002"
	doi = "doi:10.1163/156852808X375228"
}