Thinking about Normativity: Ralph Wedgwood on 'Ought'

Author: de Muijnck, Wim

Source: Journal of Moral Philosophy, Volume 7, Number 1, 2010 , pp. 133-144(12)

Publisher: BRILL

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Abstract:

Ralph Wedgwood's The Nature of Normativity provides a theory about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of normative judgments, taken to be judgments of the form 'I ought to φ'. The theory is based on the principle of Normative Judgment Internalism, and the principle that 'the intentional is normative'. I argue, first, that by being merely about oughts, Wedgwood's account leaves out one essential constituent of normativity: value. Secondly, I argue that mainly because of this, the account faces a serious issue of relevance.

Keywords: AGENCY; METAPHYSICS; NORMATIVITY; OUGHTS; RATIONALITY; VALUE

Document Type: Review article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174046809X12544019605987

Affiliations: 1: Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen, Postbus 9104, 6500 HE Nijmegen, The Netherlands;, Email: w.demuijnck@planet.nl

Publication date: 2010-01-01