Author: Lang, Gerald
Source: Journal of Moral Philosophy, Volume 6, Number 3, 2009 , pp. 317-338(22)
Publisher: BRILL
Abstract:
In this article, I appeal to the phenomenon of moral hazard in order to explain how at least some of the inequalities permitted by Luck Egalitarianism can be given an alternative, more plausible grounding than that which is supplied by Luck Egalitarianism. This alternative grounding robs Luck Egalitarianism of a potentially significant source of intuitive support whilst enabling conditional welfare policies to survive the attacks on them made by Elizabeth Anderson, Jonathan Wolff, and others.Keywords: BRUTE LUCK; INEQUALITY; LUCK EGALITARIANISM; MORAL HAZARD
Document Type: Research article
DOI: 10.1163/174552409X433418
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