II—TransparentSelf-Knowledge

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Abstract:

I distinguish two ways of explaining our capacity for ‘transparent’ knowledge of our own present beliefs, perceptions, and intentions: an inferential and a reflective approach. Alex Byrne (2011) has defended an inferential approach, but I argue that this approach faces a basic difficulty, and that a reflective approach avoids the difficulty. I conclude with a brief sketch and defence of a reflective approach to our transparent self-knowledge, and I show how this approach is connected with the thesis that we must distinguish between a kind of self-knowledge that is of oneself as agent and another kind that is of oneself as patient.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00204.x

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Emerson Hall, Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138, USA., Email: boyle2@fas.harvard.edu

Publication date: June 1, 2011

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