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I—Transparency, Belief, Intention

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This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA., Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 01 June 2011

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