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II—FictiveUtterance andImaginingII

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The currently standard approach to fiction is to define it in terms of imagination. I have argued elsewhere (Friend 2008) that no conception of imagining is sufficient to distinguish a response appropriate to fiction as opposed to non-fiction. In her contribution Kathleen Stock seeks to refute this objection by providing a more sophisticated account of the kind of propositional imagining prescribed by so-called ‘fictive utterances’. I argue that although Stock's proposal improves on other theories, it too fails to provide an adequate criterion of fictionality. I conclude by sketching an alternative account according to which fiction is a genre.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Heythrop College, University of London, Kensington Square, London W8 5HN, UK., Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 2011-06-01

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