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I—FictiveUtterance andImagining

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A popular approach to defining fictive utterance says that, necessarily, it is intended to produce imagining. I shall argue that this is not falsified by the fact that some fictive utterances are intended to be believed, or are non-accidentally true. That this is so becomes apparent given a proper understanding of the relation of what one imagines to one's belief set. In light of this understanding, I shall then argue that being intended to produce imagining is sufficient for fictive utterance as well.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QN, UK., Email: k.m.stock@sussex.ac.uk

Publication date: 2011-06-01

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