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Ineffability and Nonsense

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Abstract:

Moore proposes to cut between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ approaches to the Tractatus, suggesting that Wittgenstein's intention is to convey, through the knowing use of nonsense, ineffable understanding. I argue, first, that there is indeed room for a proposal of Moore's general kind. Secondly, though, I question whether Moore's actual proposal is not more in tune with Wittgenstein's later thought than with the attitude of the Tractatus.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00109

Affiliations: University of Stirling

Publication date: July 1, 2003

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