Ineffability and Nonsense
Author: Moore, A. W.
Source: Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Number 1, July 2003 , pp. 169-193(25)
Abstract:There are criteria of ineffability whereby, even if the concept of ineffability can never serve to modify truth, it can sometimes (non-trivially) serve to modify other things, specifically understanding. This allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and those who adopt the new reading recently championed by Diamond, Conant, and others. By maintaining that what the nonsense in the Tractatus is supposed to convey is ineffable understanding, rather than ineffable truth, we can do considerable justice to each of these readings. We can also do considerable justice to the Tractatus.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: University of Oxford
Publication date: July 1, 2003