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Emotional Truth: Ronald de Sousa

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Abstract:

Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem—objectivity—is not insurmountable.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00098

Affiliations: University of Toronto

Publication date: July 1, 2002

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