Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature: Allen W. Wood

Author: Wood, Allen W.

Source: Supplement to the Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Number 1, June 1998 , pp. 189-210(22)

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Abstract:

Kant’s moral philosophy is grounded on the dignity of humanity as its sole fundamental value, and involves the claim that human beings are to be regarded as the ultimate end of nature. It might be thought that a theory of this kind would be incapable of grounding any conception of our relation to other living things or to the natural world which would value nonhuman creatures or respect humanity’s natural environment. This paper criticizes Kant’s argumentative strategy for dealing with our duties in regard to animals, but defends both his theory and most of his conclusions on these topics.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00042

Affiliations: Yale University

Publication date: June 1, 1998

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