Skip to main content

CHEYNE'S PARADOX – AND HOW TO SOLVE IT

Buy Article:

$51.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract

Colin Cheyne's ‘paradox of reasonable believing’ poses a problem for both internalist and externalist theories of rationality. Cheyne suggests that externalists will more easily solve it. I argue the opposite.
No References
No Citations
No Supplementary Data
No Data/Media
No Metrics

Document Type: Discussion

Affiliations: University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand,

Publication date: 2012-06-01

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more