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WHY QUALIA ARE NOT EPIPHENOMENAL

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Abstract

In this article, I give an original objection to Frank Jackson's argument for the conclusion that the subjective, felt properties of experience are causally inert. I show that the very act of asserting the existence of these properties undermines the claim that they are epiphenomenal. If this objection goes through, it is fatal to the argument in question. 1
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of PhilosophyAmerican University of BeirutBeirut 1107 2020 Lebanon, Email: hmuller132000@yahoo.com

Publication date: 2008-03-01

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