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KANTIAN REASONS FOR REASONS

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Abstract

RĂ¼diger Bittner has recently argued against a Kantian ‘maxims account’ of reasons for action. In this paper I argue – against Bittner – that Kantian maxims are not to be understood as reasons for action, but rather as reasons for reasons. On the interpretation presented here, Kantian maxims are the reasons for an agent's being motivated by whatever more immediate reasons actually motivate her. This understanding of Kantian maxims suggests a recognizably realist Kantian position in ethics.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Department of PhilosophyPomona CollegeClaremont, CA 91711-6355USA, Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 2007-09-01

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