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THE GAP IS SEMANTIC, NOT EPISTEMOLOGICAL

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Abstract

This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and McGinn. On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is semantic that the mind-body problem is a quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances. 1
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: Keele UniversityStaffordshire ST5 5BGUK g.d', Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 2007-06-01

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