HOW TO ANALYSE SUBSTANCE: A REPLY TO SCHNIEDER
In a recent issue of this journal, Benjamin Schnieder has presented an objection to the account of individual substance that we have developed and put to various uses in our works on metaphysics. According to Schnieder's objection, our proposal to analyse this notion of substantiality suffers from a special kind of circularity. In this paper, we give two replies to Schnieder's objection. The first is that a successful analysis is not, in fact, required to avoid the sort of circularity about which Schnieder complains. The second is that our analysis does not involve the alleged circularity.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: 1: Department of PhilosophyUniversity of North Carolina at GreensboroGreensboro, North Carolina 27402-6170USA, Email: firstname.lastname@example.org 2: Department of PhilosophyUniversity of North Carolina at GreensboroGreensboro, North Carolina 27402-6170USA, Email: email@example.com
Publication date: March 1, 2007