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EASY CASES AND VALUE INCOMMENSURABILITY

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Abstract:

Abstract

Several critics have denied value incommensurability – or the claim, roughly, that there is no common measure in terms of which values can be weighed – on the basis of what we might call the argument from easy cases. Although the argument from easy cases is quite popular, what is much less often discussed is what exactly the argument entails – in other words, what sort of further commitments the argument generates. Suppose we grant that easy cases point to the existence of a common measure. How then should we think about this common measure? What is its scope? How widely does it range? I attempt to clarify these questions and in the process evaluate the force of the argument from easy cases.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00344.x

Affiliations: Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MontanaMissoula, MT 59812, Email: stephen.grimm@mso.umt.edu

Publication date: 2007-03-01

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