POSSIBLE EVILS

Author: Hazlett, Allan

Source: Ratio, Volume 19, Number 2, June 2006 , pp. 191-198(8)

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Abstract:

I consider an objection to Lewisian modal realism: the view entails that there are a great many real evils that we ought to care about, but in fact we shouldn't care about these evils. I reply on behalf of the modal realist – we should and do care about possible evils, and this is shown in our reactions to fictions about evils, which (plausibly, for the modal realist) are understood as making certain possible evils salient.¹

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00319.x

Affiliations: 1: Texas Tech UniversityLubbock, TX 79409, USA, Email: allanhazlett@gmail.com

Publication date: 2006-06-01